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Viewing Family Court Practice
Through the Prism of Purpose
DONNA H. LEE*
INTRODUCTION
This Reply focuses on a fundamental question: what is the
primary purpose of the Family Court when faced with intra-
family disputes? I explore how competing conceptions of purpose
affect our understanding of the Family Court's role in order of
protection, custody and visitation, and child and spousal support
cases. I recently had the privilege of co-facilitating a working
group of experienced practitioners whose task was to re-imagine
the work and structure of the New York Family Court and then
develop recommendations for change.1 While our conversation
was rich and wide-ranging, what most surprised me was the diffi-
culty we had agreeing on a vision of what the Family Court
should do. A review of some of the relevant literature reveals a
longstanding debate on the proper role of the Family Court and
repeated reform efforts.2 Upon reflection on our discussion, I
* Associate Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. Many thanks to Sue Bryant,
Leah Hill, Emily Rubin, and Jane Spinak for their support and for reviewing an earlier
draft. Their stamina and grace in doing the difficult work of representing women and
children in Family Court, and their clarity in thinking about this work are an inspiration.
1. My co-facilitator was Professor Leah Hill of Fordham Law School, and the work-
ing group participants reflected the Conference Planning Committee's hard work to gather
a diverse group of stakeholders, such as attorneys and advocates for battered women and
children, Family Court judges, academics, social workers, and service providers. We were
also fortunate to be joined by Adam Sparks, a Columbia Law School student, who pre-
pared the Working Group Report. Other working groups focused on the areas of delin-
quency, abuse and neglect, and foster care.
2. See, e.g., Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving
Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 1459, 1505-09 (2004);
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have concluded that lawyers should partner with social scientists
to develop controlled experiments with different court models
that have clearly expressed goals, as well as detailed plans for
data collection to determine whether those goals have been met.
THE WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION
While there have been many iterations of a conceptual divide
in defining the Family Court's purpose,3 our group identified a
binary choice between adjudicating legal disputes and addressing
underlying problems in family disputes. The cohort that favored
a traditional, legal dispute resolution approach focused on the
need for revitalized due process protections for litigants. From
their perspective, the Family Court's mandate should be to ren-
der fair, considered, and prompt decisions. Delay was a dominant
concern. Other considerations included eliminating racial and
class bias in decision-making, promoting civility and respect for
litigants, and increasing the resources devoted to Family Court.
In contrast, those who defined the problem more broadly as a
family dispute tended to reach for the more ambitious goal of im-
proving family dynamics, which seemed often to entail the provi-
sion of social services. Adherents to this approach asked why a
person comes to Family Court and what she or he hopes to gain.
Their general answer was: to resolve a problem in a family rela-
tionship when other methods are unavailable or have failed.
Thus, the touchstone for this cohort was not due process, but
rather interdisciplinary expertise. For example, if one of the fac-
tors contributing to an intra-family dispute is domestic violence,
alcoholism, or drug addiction, then an effective decision maker
needs some level of expertise in these areas. From this perspec-
tive, legal rights are inextricably linked to social, psychological,
and economic needs.
Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The Potential of Model Family Courts, 2002
WIS. L. REV. 331, 332-41 (2002); Developments in the Law - The Law of Marriage and
Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2104-13 (2003).
3. See, e.g., MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (2005)
(critiquing posited opposition between children's rights and parents' rights); Clare Hunt-
ington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637, 640 (2006) (framing
debate as between "family preservationists" and "child protectionists").
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Both subgroups seemed to arrive at their conceptions of the
proper role of the Family Court by drawing on their experiences
with various client groups. Lawyers who represent women seek-
ing orders of protection, custody, visitation, or support tended to
view courts as institutions that should apply legal standards,
conduct fact-finding through an adversarial, truth-seeking proc-
ess, and enter judgments that resolve the legal problem pre-
sented by the petitioner. Lawyers who represent children tended
to want courts to elevate the "best interests of the child" above all
else and to perform tasks beyond fact-finding and applying the
law.4 These tasks include garnering resources and services for
children and families and holding the agencies that provide these
services accountable.
While our working group maintained an excellent esprit de
corps throughout the two-day conference, each subgroup implic-
itly and explicitly critiqued the other.5 The due process subgroup
referred to mandatory services as "disservices,"6 and posited that
the multifaceted "best interests of the child" standard provides no
real guidance to litigants or decision makers. They placed a high
value on parent autonomy and expressed concern about the po-
tential unintended effects of ordering parents to participate -
personally and with their children - in programs.7 Intuitively,
4. Some of the complexities embedded in representing children in intra-family dis-
putes include being haled into court involuntarily, potential questions of substituted
judgment, and, in custody and visitation cases, physically embodying the legal remedy
sought by the other litigants.
5. I interpreted the working group conversations through my own lens as a professor
in a law school clinical program that represents battered women in Family Court on mat-
ters involving intrafamily disputes. For purposes of drawing a contrast, I have crystal-
lized and pushed to the edges comments that were more nuanced and balanced at the time
they were made. My hope is that sharpening some of the edges will lead to greater ana-
lytical clarity.
6. They recognized the potential value of social services, but maintained that access-
ing services should be voluntary and not tied to a court proceeding. One potential model is
the work of the federally-funded "Family Justice Centers," which enable local district
attorneys' offices to vigorously prosecute domestic violence crimes while providing a wide
range of services to victims. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Justice, First Family Justice
Center Opens in Brooklyn, New York (July 20, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2005/July/05_ojp_382.htm.
7. One such effect is to create additional hurdles for parents and children, whose
resources are already stretched thin by economic and social pressures, without providing
any real benefit in return. This concern is implicitly predicated on an assumption that a
particular mandated program will not actually help a family and thus imposes transac-
tional costs without any counterbalancing gains.
20071
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defining the court's role narrowly and trying to cabin its power
through procedural rules would have the effect of maximizing
individual autonomy.
The interdisciplinary expertise subgroup, however, pointed
out that children and respondents do not opt into Family Court
litigation. The proceedings are, in this sense, already coercive for
one segment of participants. This group focused more on a child's
need for stability and finality than parental autonomy. It linked
the phenomenon of "frequent filers" with a failure to reach a mul-
tidisciplinary, fully considered decision in the first instance' and
maintained that it is imperative to involve other disciplines and
embed them in the governing legal framework. This is a theo-
retically optimistic view of the Family Court as an institution
that can generate multiple solutions, including legal and non-
legal remedies.9 Attempting to meet both the legal and social
needs of families, however, would require implementation of an
explicit analytic process for evaluating multidisciplinary inputs. 10
After two days of discussion, our working group came to con-
sensus and drafted recommendations to present to all conference
participants. We posited: "The Family Court's principal focus
should be on the adjudication of disputes, in addition to providing
access to appropriate resources when necessary to effect a court-
ordered remedy." This language represents a compromise be-
tween the two subgroups. It allows for the provision of services
when those services are tightly linked to the court's legal conclu-
sion. In other words, the proposed remedy must have a sufficient
nexus with the court's legal conclusion.1'
8. The phrase "frequent filers" refers derogatorily to litigants who initiate multiple
court actions. While commonly used to refer to prisoners' cases, it may also apply to those
who repeatedly litigate child custody, visitation, and support matters. The fact that a
parent may file a second or third petition in Family Court, however, does not necessarily
mean that the first adjudication failed or that re-filing is a bad decision. Family issues are
obviously not static; they evolve over time and thus may legitimately require re-
adjudication.
9. Cf Spinak, supra note 2, at 352-53 (describing National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges' effort to encourage judges to play a more proactive leadership role).
10. One working group participant analogized to the special education process under
the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act by which an interdisciplinary
committee, including a child's parents and teachers, develops a tailored Individualized
Educational Program for each child. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414 (West 2007).
11. The group intended to discourage courts from ordering participation in social
services programs by default or habit. Cf. Casey, supra note 2, at 1489-504 (discussing
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MY THOUGHTS AND PROPOSAL
I agree with our consensus conceptualization of the Family
Court's proper role. The traditional role of courts is to decide in-
dividual disputes, and I am reluctant to give courts a more
broadly defined mandate to fix family dynamics. This reluctance
stems from both legitimacy and competency concerns. The spe-
cific mention of resources, however, highlights the important role
that courts must play to ensure that legal remedies are enforced.
The prototypical example of a resource "necessary to effect a
court-ordered remedy" is participation in a supervised visitation
program. As a practical matter, when a Family Court judge per-
mits visitation, but rules that it must be supervised, litigants fre-
quently have difficulty finding a program that works with their
schedules, locations, and daily lives. Consequently, suboptimal,
informal arrangements relying on relatives or friends to play the
role of supervisor are common. Our working group seemed to
unanimously recognize the legitimacy of supervised visitation as
a court-ordered remedy and the need for programs and services to
effectuate this remedy. It did not, however, accept mandated
participation in parenting classes, job training, or an anger man-
agement program in the same way. Explaining this differential
response sheds some light on our working group's difficulty in
answering the initial question about the Family Court's primary
purpose, and points towards an approach to mediating between
due process and interdisciplinary expertise.
A part of this distinction is what some group members charac-
terized as the difference between providing resources and a mean-
ingful remedy for families as opposed to mandating participation
in untested programs. If the opportunity to have visitation is
predicated on participation by a third-party supervisor, then pro-
grams that supply this service, almost regardless of content, are
welcome. Although one might think that an anger management
program could be substituted for supervised visitation as the
condition precedent for visitation, this analogy fails. Supervised
legitimacy concerns based on the expanded role of judges and loosening of procedural
protections in problem-solving courts).
2007] 651
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visitation has legitimacy as a court-ordered remedy that other
programs do not share.12
In a sense, a supervised visitation program always "works" if
the goal is abstractly defined as enabling the visitation to occur.
A program need only exist in order to show quantifiable results in
the form of hours of visitation that actually occur. 3 A program
like anger management, on the other hand, whether structured
through classes, individual therapy, or group therapy, does not
occur simultaneously with visitation. The success of such pro-
grams is also more difficult to quantify because they unavoidably
require a more qualitative assessment of an individual's progress.
For example, one measure of success might be a participant's
ability to manage his or her anger in the context of an intra-
family dispute.' 4 Finally, participation in any program external
to the actual visitation represents an additional burden.
Some innovative programming and experimentation is already
in place, and the Family Court has been taking on more broadly
defined responsibilities, including some traditionally held by so-
cial services agencies. Problem-solving courts such as the Inte-
grated Domestic Violence (IDV) Courts have, by design, one judge
addressing the various legal issues affecting one family. The IDV
Courts' express goals include ensuring enhanced services for vic-
tims and holding offenders accountable. 5 Family courts in gen-
eral have also been drawn into the role of a social service agency,
with the power to penalize litigants for noncompliance, and some
12. One reason may be that visitation in any form is the long-recognized, accepted
remedy for a meritorious petition for visitation. Cf. ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD,
DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 139-53 (2003)
(criticizing imposition of broadly drawn injunctive relief against government defendants
where the remedy is not closely tied to the proven legal claim).
13. I do not intend to disparage those high quality supervised visitation programs
that strive to make a real difference in the dynamics between parents and their children
and to nurture healthy relationships. I mean only to emphasize the significant overlap, if
not congruence, between the legal remedy of visitation and the service of providing "su-
pervision" for the visitation.
14. Theoretically, participation in a supervised visitation program also requires a
qualitative evaluation of the parent-child interaction, and graduating from supervised to
unsupervised visitation requires a qualitative improvement in that interaction as assessed
by a psychiatric, psychological, or social work professional. In practice, however, many
individuals are unable to access such programs and must rely on informal supervised
visitation arrangements.
15. See Problem Solving Courts, httpJ/www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/domesticviolence/
index.shtml (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (providing an overview of IDV Courts).
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have called for judges to play more of a leadership role in main-
taining and promoting healthy, functional families.1" I support
these reform efforts, but think that establishing performance cri-
teria and collecting the data necessary to assess performance is
essential to effecting lasting reform.
I wholeheartedly agree with our working group's recommen-
dation that the Family Court develop a research component to
collect, evaluate, and communicate data about its own perform-
ance. Such research should examine how well or poorly the sys-
tem is working for all stakeholders. It also should be transpar-
ent, meaning the data should be made available to the general
public. The information generated could be used in a myriad of
ways, such as by putative petitioners in deciding whether to ini-
tiate an action, by respondents in deciding whether to settle, by
courts, and potentially by legislators to better inform future deci-
sions. 7
I propose that lawyers who have expertise with the Family
Court process in intra-family disputes partner with social scien-
tists to create a proactive, goal-setting culture on a systems
level.'" While individual judges and advocates continue to litigate
and adjudicate individual cases, others could take a step back
and, in a manner that provides for and values community input,
develop controlled experiments to examine whether specifically
identified problems could be solved through some combination of
16. See, e.g., Spinak, supra note 2, at 353-55 (describing belief of Progressive era
reformers in judges' supervisory role and more current conceptualization of judges' leader-
ship role by Chief Judge Judith Kaye in the New York State court system).
17. If, for example, a Support Magistrate orders several respondents to participate in
a particular job training program, and none of them are subsequently able to secure em-
ployment, then the next time the judge might decide to use a different program or decline
to require participation in any program. Conversely, if litigants were consistently satis-
fied with a particular parenting program, then a decision-maker could decide to use that
program exclusively.
18. The literature discussing the benefits and dangers of problem-solving courts could
help to inform this institutional, cultural shift. See Casey, supra note 2, at 1489-504
(discussing impending legitimacy crisis); Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-
Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1503-
06 (2003) (surveying some potential dangers of problem-solving courts); Eric Lane, Due
Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955, 960-61 (2003) (analyzing
and critiquing potential due process problems with problem-solving judging and lawyer-
ing); Lisa Lightman & Francine Byrne, Addressing the Co-Occurrence of Domestic Violence
and Substance Abuse: Lessons from Problem-Solving Courts, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAM.,
CHILD. & CTS. 53, 55-57, 59-66 (2005) (discussing potential benefits and challenges of
linking judicial intervention with service programs).
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additional resources and restructuring. Looking through the
prism of purpose, our working group framed a dichotomy between
legal and family disputes. In a system that handled well over
200,000 filings per year from January 2000 through June 2005,19
however, it is not necessary to choose between strict adherence to
historical understandings of due process or an interdisciplinary
approach. We can do both.
The overwhelming concerns about delay could be addressed by
experimenting in one courthouse with a trial part.20 The trial
part judge would be relieved of all the pre-trial work in the nu-
merous cases that end up settling. Other judges in the Family
Court would refer trial-ready cases to this judge who could pre-
side, for example, over a custody case every day, all day, and on
consecutive days, until that trial is done. He or she could then
preside over the next trial. This model would present a sharp
contrast with the current system in which a trial may take
months to conclude because the judge's calendar only allows for
conducting a trial for a few hours on one day and then requires
waiting another six to eight weeks until another several hour
block of time becomes available.
At the same time, in another courthouse, we could require half
the judges who adjudicate custody cases to participate in inten-
sive interdisciplinary training. The other half could serve as the
control group. The judges in the training group could learn from
psychiatrists, psychologists, and social work professionals about
domestic violence, child psychology, alcoholism, and chemical de-
pendency. They could visit and tour various program sites and
potentially participate in a session or two to gain personal experi-
ence with a program to which they may routinely refer litigants.
These judges could be tested by the trainers on the information
they are being asked to master. The newly created research and
development arm of the Family Court could gather feedback from
parents and their lawyers, children and law guardians, forensic
experts, and the judges themselves before and after the training
to try to measure its value added. Social scientists could also
conduct surveys and focus groups of stakeholders throughout the
19. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., FAM. CT. N.Y.C., REPORT OF CASELOAD ACTIVITY BY
TYPE OF PROCEEDING (2005) (on file with the Journal).
20. Our working group considered but ultimately decided against recommending the
creation of trial parts.
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courthouse to have a basis for comparing the performance of the
judges who participated in the training with those who did not.
Measurement of performance outcomes is obviously critical to
advancing reform goals. I envision experimentation that entails:
developing a hypothesis and performance criteria; communicating
with stakeholders who could inform, advise and help shape the
innovations; trying something new for a set period of time; col-
lecting the relevant data; and then evaluating that data to con-
firm or disprove the hypothesis. With the example of trial parts,
the hypothesis could be that a trial part would reduce overall
caseloads levels by X percent, cut the average time from case fil-
ing to case closing by Y months, and increase litigants' confidence
in the Family Court process. A courthouse without a trial part,
but with similar numbers of judges and cases filed could serve as
the control. After the designated period for experimentation had
elapsed, the research and development arm of the court could
analyze and publicize the comparative results.
CONCLUSION
Our working group characterized the Family Court's adjudica-
tion of intra-family disputes as a system in crisis and spent a fair
amount of time focusing on the resource question. My proposal
for differently configured model courts that operate as experi-
ments frames the question differently. I would not focus nar-
rowly on whether we need more judges and courthouse support
staff. From my perspective, the obvious answer to that question
is yes. Increasing the number of judges and support staff, how-
ever, is a finger-in-the-dyke solution. Rather than accepting the
current paradigm and simply trying to do the business of the
Family Court faster and better, I propose that we seek to develop
a culture of innovation and accountability. Having started with
the question of purpose, I am now convinced that controlled ex-
perimentation that marshals data and builds a persuasive case
for what does and does not work in Family Court is the necessary
foundation for sustaining the political will to implement change.
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